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FOR RELEASE 10:00 A.M., EST MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1972
STATEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
ON
ESTIMATES, FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS OF 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
BEFORE THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
INTRODUCTION
I am Wallace E. Olson, Executive Vice President of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The 
Institute is the national professional association of certified 
public accountants. It is composed of more than 88,000 members, 
residing in every state of the Union.
With me today are LeRoy Layton, President of the 
American Institute, and Douglas R. Carmichael, Director of the 
Institute’s Technical Research Division. The American Institute 
fills a distinct and important role in our economic system by 
setting the standards which must be adhered to by Institute 
members in their independent examinations of financial statements.
The Institute’s Board of Directors has authorized 
me to present views today even though the Institute’s senior 
technical committees have not yet reached definitive conclusions 
on the subject of forecasting. Accordingly, I would not wish 
any of my remarks today, or any remarks previously given in these 
proceedings by representatives of the Institute, to indicate 
that final positions relating to forecasts have been reached on 
behalf of the Institute. In addition, it should not be implied
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that all Institute members necessarily agree with the views which 
I will present. Some CPA firms have already appeared before 
these hearings to express their opinions.
QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED
Our comments will address what we believe to be the 
two most fundamental questions concerning publication of forecasts 
of economic performance:
1. Whether forecasts should be required, merely 
permitted, or prohibited in whole or in part 
in filings with the Commission?
2. If forecasts are permitted or required, what 
precautions and standards are necessary for 
the protection of investors?
In addressing those questions, we will discuss the 
following related matters: (1) the definition of forecasts,
(2) forecasting methods and practices, (3) the accuracy of 
forecasts, (4) current forecast publication practices, (5) the 
benefits of publication, (6) the dangers of publication, (7) the 
problem of liability, (8) our recommendations on publication, 
and (9) our recommendations on safeguards.
Following the discussion of these matters we will 
comment briefly on the remainder of the seven specific issues 
mentioned in the Commission’s notice of hearing.
DEFINITIONS OF FORECASTS
Although the Commission has used the terms "estimates,
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forecasts and projections of economic performance” we shall use 
the single term "forecasts” in our comments solely for the sake 
of brevity.
The term "forecasts” is frequently applied to data 
which may vary greatly in format, extent of detail and purpose.
For this reason, a careful definition of what constitutes a 
"forecast” is an important first requirement if the Commission 
is to relax its present prohibition against public disclosure 
of forecasts.
While we do not intend to suggest a precise definition 
it is necessary, for purposes of clarity, to stress the following:
1, Our comments are not directed to the type of 
forecasts which are intended purely for manage­
ment purposes and may be deliberately overstated 
as goals for corporate personnel. Such forecasts 
are commonly referred to as budgets.
2. Forecasts of economic performance include both 
profit forecasts and cash flow forecasts which 
are integrally related. A forecast of cash 
receipts and disbursements is inevitably based 
on a forecast of profits.
3. For purposes of our discussion, we intend the 
term "forecasts” to mean financial summaries of 
the best possible estimates of future expecta­
tions.
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FORECASTINC METHODS AND PRACTICE
A study for the Financial Executives Institute con­
ducted by A. T. Kearney & Company, Inc. showed that all of the 
338 companies that responded to the survey prepare forecasts 
for their internal use. Over 97 per cent of the responding 
companies prepare corporate earnings, sales, and expense 
forecasts. The study did not disclose the precise methods used 
in preparing forecasts.
In general, however, a forecast begins with past 
experience as a base, but management must then consider the 
factors which will affect the economy and their industry in 
general and their business in particular in the future. Examples 
of such factors are: (1) economic indicators and trends, (2) 
market surveys, (3) engineering studies of future costs and 
levels of production, (4) labor relations, (5) possible 
legislation and (6) the financial resources required and the 
means of generating these resources. Management must project 
revenue (volume, price and inflation), level of production, 
capital expenditures, and related costs and activities. These 
projections must then be translated into financial statement form.
The forecasting process is basically an art and is 
a multidisciplinary undertaking. No standards exist for the 
process itself or for the format of a completed forecast. An 
essential ingredient of a forecast is an in-depth knowledge of 
the company and the markets in which it competes. Because of 
the diversity of factors to be considered, forecasting will
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never achieve precision and it is unlikely that generally 
accepted methods will evolve in the foreseeable future.
ACCURACY OF FORECASTS
Several studies of the accuracy of forecasts have 
been made. The study conducted for the FEI by A. T. Kearney 
& Company, Inc. showed that corporate earnings variance in 
excess of 20 per cent was typical for 13 per cent of the 
companies surveyed and almost one quarter of the companies 
have results that typically differ from the forecast by more 
than 10 per cent. On the other hand, over 90 per cent of the 
companies had a variance within plus or minus 10 per cent for 
corporate sales. Other studies have shown that revenues can 
be forecasted with reasonably accurate results, but substantially 
less accuracy is possible for forecasting earnings.
A study of the accuracy of profit forecasts in bid 
situations in the United Kingdom by C. A. Westwick of the 
English Institute of Chartered Accountants showed slightly 
better results. Of 210 forecasts, 170 (8l per cent) were 
met within a margin of plus or minus 10 per cent. This study 
showed that the accuracy of forecasts increases the nearer 
they are made to the end of the year to which they relate and 
that generally forecasts that extend too far into the future 
are less reliable than short-term forecasts.
The accuracy of a forecast is dependent largely 
on the quality of the underlying assumptions. Some assumptions
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which result in such amounts as estimated sales and related 
costs depend upon the economics of the business. Supply and 
demand factors play an important role in the reasonableness 
and potential accuracy of these assumptions.
Other assumptions might be described as contingencies. 
The outcome must be assumed one way or another because no 
means exist for determining it otherwise. Some contingencies may 
affect only the company, such as strikes, litigation and natural 
catastrophies. Other contingencies may affect the country or 
an industry as a whole, such as tax rates, foreign exchange 
rates and regulations, and government regulatory action. No 
objective methods exist for determining assumptions of this 
type; they must simply be chosen —  one way or another. It is 
the actual outcome o f  assumptions of this type that cause the 
most dramatic fluctuations between forecasts and results.
Because of the nature of contingency assumptions 
and the inherent difficulties in predicting the econonics 
of a business, the accuracy of forecasts over the whole 
spectrum of business is likely to fall far short of acceptable 
limits. No amount of development of methods will ever fully 
overcome this fundamental problem of accuracy of forecasts.
Also, disclosure of assumptions is not a cure for lack of 
accuracy since it serves merely to provide information on 
the nature of the assumptions made and to draw the attention 
of investors to the particular risks to which a business 
is most prone.
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We have used the term accuracy in connection with 
our discussion of forecasts to denote the degree to which 
actual results fall within acceptable tolerance limits of 
a forecast. Sometimes the term reliability is also used 
for this purpose. Regardless of the terminology used, it 
is important to note that both the soundness of forecasting 
methods and the quality of underlying assumptions have a 
significant bearing on the degree of variance of actual 
from forecasted results.
CURRENT FORECAST PUBLICATION PRACTICE
Publication of earnings projections is not uncommon. 
Companies sometimes release forecasts to financial analysts 
and others. Also, analysts prepare and disseminate forecasts 
and some companies will comment on the quality of an analysts 
forecast.
When a company’s own projection differs substantially 
from one published by an analyst, half the respondents to 
the FEI study indicated that they inform the analyst of the 
difference. In addition, some analysts review their projections 
with the company’s chief financial executive prior to publica­
tion. Most companies in the FEI study stated that they tell 
the analyst if he is beyond the range of reasonableness.
Over 50 per cent of the companies release projections to 
analysts in individual interviews or at analyst society 
meetings. Only 12 per cent of the companies release forecasts 
in general communications media.
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A study for the National Association of Accountants 
completed in 1970 by Morton Backer showed that a substantial 
majority (72.8%) of the 70 companies surveyed disclose profit 
projections either publicly, or privately to analysts. 
Approximately a third of the companies (32.8%) disclose 
projections in press releases, speeches to analysts, or 
other public communication media. Another 40% of the 
companies do not publicize earnings, but will comment on 
the reasonableness of an analyst’s projection.
Our own study of projection disclosure in the 
annual reports of the 600 companies included in our annual 
survey, Accounting Trends and Techniques, showed that only 
four companies disclose quantified projections. Another 234 
companies include qualitative statements about future 
prospects. Normally, those disclosures appear in the 
president’s letter.
Thus, a substantial amount of disclosure of earnings 
projections exists, but the information is not widely 
disseminated.
BENEFITS OF PUBLICATION
Two primary benefits and several subsidiary benefits 
might be expected from the publication of forecasts. First, 
general publication could eliminate the possibly prejudicial 
practice of releasing earnings projections to analysts 
without simultaneous release to stockholders.
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Second, publication Of forecasts would provide 
additional information for investment decisions. How 
investment decisions are made is not known with certainty, 
but it seems logical that they involve an appraisal of a 
company’s future prospects. Consequently, an earnings 
projection would be relevant information. Management 
possesses far more data and knowledge than analysts about 
the company’s future prospects and should, therefore, be 
able to prepare better forecasts.
The possible subsidiary benefits are: (1) those 
companies without adequate forecasting systems would tend 
to establish them, (2) the information would also be 
available to government and to economists for planning,
(3) the attendant disclosure of assumptions would be more 
valuable to investors than forecasts made by various 
investment advisors disseminated without explanation 
and (4) the availability of forecasts might reduce the 
need for the ever growing volume of supplemental disclosures, 
such as expense itemization and order backlog, designed to 
facilitate prediction of future earnings.
DANGERS OF PUBLICATION
The impact of the public availability of forecasts 
on the economy, and particularly the investment community, 
is an unknown of major consequence. Therefore, many dangers 
associated with publication of forecasts have quite correctly
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been brought to the Commission’s attention. We shall
consider only the major dangers without intentionally
discounting the others.
A major danger is that the investing public 
will place undue reliance on forecasts if they are published 
in annual reports and included in filings with the Commission. 
Investors may not recognize the inherent unreliability of 
a forecast. They may attribute the reliability of historical 
data to forecasts —  a totally unwarranted attribution.
If public expectations exceed the feasible level 
of accuracy of forecasts, the investing public and all 
those associated with the publication of financial data —  
management, directors, accountants, and underwriters —  may 
suffer. The consequences are costly litigation, diminished 
credibility, and a general loss of investor confidence.
In summary, if published forecasts are permitted, 
they will become simuntaneously highly important and the 
least reliable information available. A forecast is easy 
prey for unintentional bias, for overenthusiasm and, 
indeed, for deliberate attempts to mislead. Thus the 
argument is not one-sided. Both the benefits and the 
dangers are considerable.
THE PROBLEM OF LIABILITY
The responsibilities imposed on management, directors, 
experts and underwriters for the accuracy of historical infor­
mation under Federal securities law are already severe.
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Imposition of similar responsibilities for forecasts would be 
unreasonable in view of the inherent inaccuracy of forecasts.
The exposure to liability with respect to forecasts 
which may arise under Federal securities law is a grave concern. 
At first blush, the impact of potential liability under the 
’33 Act appears to present the most immediate and visible 
peril. Section 11 of that Act, as the Commission well knows, 
shifts the burden of proof of diligence to all defendants in 
a registered public offering save the issuer, rather than leaving 
it to the plaintiff to make out negligence, and deprives the 
issuer itself of any such defense.
However, the potential for liability under the '34 
Act could ultimately prove even more serious. Liability under 
the '33 Act can always —  or nearly always —  be avoided by 
prudent and conservative understatement, but under the ’34 Act 
even these responsible measures —  presently employed in 
Britain —  can lead to claims of damages by frustrated sellers 
of securities. The potential for such whipsaw is especially 
serious where the representation involved consists of projected 
earnings per share.
Another serious problem concerns the potential for 
liability in respect of forecasts gone sour which are not 
promptly updated. On this score, the issuer will almost daily 
from the time a forecast is issued be receiving indications 
that actual experience is at variance with projected assumptions.
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It may well be necessary to impose some limitations on the 
frequency of updating in light of such indications if the public 
is not to be deluged with information it cannot digest. It 
seems to us to be most unrealistic to require supplementary 
disclosure in respect of forecasts until management has 
thoroughly digested and evaluated the supplemental indications. 
However it is limited and refined —  and we think it should be
—  we think that whatever responsibility remains in respect
of updating should rest entirely with management. No one else 
will have sufficient information to do it; and any attempt 
to update or sound an alarm on less than all available knowledge 
and information will only confuse the public.
The potential for liability and litigation is significant 
because a forecast is particuarly susceptible to being misunder­
stood by the investing public. Whether undue liability will be 
established by litigation will depend heavily on the application 
to forecasts of certain terms used in the ’33 and ’34 Acts.
For example, will representations contained in forecasts be 
interpreted as "material facts” for purposes of the liability 
provisions of the securities statutes?
An equally important question concerns the manner in 
which responsibility will be assessed when a forecast is not 
borne out by actual events. Forecasts will very likely fall 
wide of the mark without there being justifying imposition of 
liability on anyone. The degree to which a forecast is missed
—  no matter by how much —  will often very likely rest on
-13-
matters outside the issuer’s or anyone’s control. For example, 
an assumption might be that labor availability will not be 
disrupted by a strike. If a wildcat strike in an industry with 
a history of labor tranquility caused the forecast to be missed, 
however substantial the margin, it would be clearly inequitable 
if a cause of action were found.
These are serious problems which deserve careful 
consideration. If there is to be experimentation with the 
public disclosure of forecasts, we respectfully submit that 
as an essential prerequisite the Commission must do two things: 
First, it must use its regulatory powers to define the term 
"material fact” as it appears in the liability provisions of 
the federal securities statutes and related regulations, so 
as to exclude from that term at the very least the estimates 
and assumptions contained in forecasts. Second, until much 
more i s  known about forecasting, the Commission should take 
the position, whether by regulation or interpretive release, 
that liability for forecasts should be limited to instances of 
recklessness or bad faith. This formulation would require the 
makers of a forecast to consider their basis for doing so.
Any standard of liability otherwise framed would leave the 
makers of a forecast so concerned for their own potential peril 




The "publication” decision is both extremely important 
and complex. Many imponderables must be weighed, and value 
judgments made. The apparent alternatives are: (1) prohibit 
any dissemination of forecasts and improve the controls over 
communications to financial advisors, (2) permit disclosure of 
forecasts at a company's discretion, and (3) make disclosure 
of forecasts mandatory.
We believe that at the present time there is far 
too little knowledge about what the results may be of publication 
of forecasts on either a permissive or mandatory basis. However, 
the possible benefits of publication, which we have previously 
enumerated, pursuade us to believe that permissive publication 
for a trial period of time would be desirable.
In our view, the following program should be adopted 
in connection with a trial period of permissive publication 
of forecasts:
1. Guidelines to be followed in connection with 
publication of forecasts would have to be 
established by the Commission. Such guidelines 
should deal with:
a. Methods of publication and distribution.
b. The formats and degree of detail which 
will be permitted.
c. Whether publication, once commenced, must 
be continued at regular intervals.
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d. The circumstances under which updating 
will be required and the methods thereof.
e. Whether a third-party review will be 
required and whether publication of a 
report on the review will also be mandatory.
2. When guidelines have been established on the fore­
going matters, a trial period of permissive publi­
cation of forecasts could begin.
3. After a reasonable period of experience, the 
Commission would be in a position to reach a better 
informed decision as to whether to prohibit, permit 
or require the inclusion of forecasts in filings 
with the Commission.
4. Assuming that the decision was to either continue 
permissive publication or to make it mandatory, 
the next step would be to refine the guidelines on 
matters previously mentioned.
5. The final step in the process would be to implement 
the decision.
Although we are not prepared to recommend what all of 
the guidelines should be, we have concluded that:
1. Once a company began to disclose forecasts in
filings, it should thereafter be required to con­
tinue disclosure unless prohibition was reinstated 
or the company could demonstrate sound reasons 
for discontinuance.
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2. Any permission to publish forecasts should be
accompanied by a requirement of an accompanying 
report on a review by a third party. We shall 
comment further on this in a few minutes.
In summary, we believe that after establishing suitable 
guidelines, the Commission should permit publication of forecasts 
for a trial period during which time it could encourage companies 
to disclose forecasts. This should provide the experience 
necessary to form a sound basis for reaching a decision as to 
whether prohibition or permissive or mandatory publication 
would best serve the public interest in the long run.
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRECAUTIONS
As many precautions as possible should be adopted to 
reduce the dangers of unwarranted reliance by investors, the 
potential for abuse, and unjustifiable litigation.
The problem of unwarranted reliance may be alleviated 
by care in format requirements. The format of a forecast should 
be as clearly distinguishable as possible from that of historical 
financial statements and should convey the basic uncertainty 
of a forecast. One means of communicating forecast uncertainty 
is presentation of the data in ranges rather than in single 
figures. However, range presentation might have the reverse 
effect if it unduly increased expectations that forecasts would 
fall within the range.
Other format suggestions which have been mentioned by
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some, consist of avoidance of side-by-side presentation of 
forecasts and historical data or arranging data in a narrative 
rather than financial statement form. We doubt that such 
precautions would, in practice, be realistic.
Perhaps the most important precaution against 
unreliable forecasts would be a review by a third party. The 
alternatives regarding this possibility are: (1) no review,
(2) review and publication of a report by the third party, 
and (3) review with limited dissemination of a report, such 
as restricting it to the company’s board of directors.
As previously indicated, we believe that publication 
of forecasts should be accompanied by a third party review 
and report thereon. There is simply too much potential for 
abuse in the publication of forecasts to allow their circulation 
without a third-party review. Investors should not be required 
to accept forecasts on the premise that the issuers have not 
acted recklessly or in bad faith.
If the Commission decides to permit or require dis­
closure of forecasts and concludes that third party reviews 
and reports are necessary, we think that CPAs would be a 
logical group to perform this function. Accordingly, we would 
like to comment on the various factors which must be taken
into account if CPAs are to be involved.
Because forecasts are based largely on considered 
guesses about the future, it is not possible for a CPA or any
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other third-party expert, whatever his field or competence, 
to vouch for their achievability or reliability. Neither can 
a third party express an objective opinion about the reason­
ableness of assumptions since many of the assumptions are 
simply predictions for which there are no available means 
of objective verification. To express purely subjective 
opinions about management’s assumptions would not seem to 
provide any reasonable assurance to investors and could under 
some circumstances be contrary to their best interests.
Despite these substantial limitations, a review 
by an independent CPA would serve as a useful precaution 
since there are several functions that could be performed. 
They are as follows:
1. The mathematics and mechancial accuracy of 
compilation of the forecasts could be 
verified.
2. The conformity of the forecasts with generally 
accepted accounting principles could be 
verified.
3. The methods and procedures followed in develop­
ing the forecast could be reviewed to determine 
whether they conformed with established norms. 
Since standards do not presently exist in
this area, they would have to be developed 
before this function could be carried out.
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4. The forecast could be reviewed on an over­
all basis to form a judgment as to whether it 
clearly had been prepared recklessly or in 
bad faith. However, it would not be possible 
to give positive assurance that this was not 
the case.
The content and wording of a CPA’s report on his 
review of a forecast would pose a difficult problem of how to 
communicate to investors the exact nature of his representations. 
Great care would have to be exercised to avoid conveying to 
investors an impression of greater credibility than would be 
warranted. The Institute’s Auditing Standards Division is 
currently studying this matter.
A concern has been expressed by some that a CPA’s 
independence would be impaired with respect to historical 
financial statements if he were also to report on a review of 
forecasts. Serving in a dual role would certainly pose some 
possibility of conflict but no more so than those now faced 
in auditing historical financial statements or in other areas 
of practice. Powerful counter-balancing forces exist which 
make it imperative for CPAs to withstand the pressures of 
possible conflicts to survive in practice. We believe that 
the crucial test of independence is not the nature of the service 
being rendered but the nature of the relationship between a CPA 
and his client. For these reasons we do not feel that reporting
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on a review of forecasts would place any undue strain on a 
CPA’s objectivity with respect to historical financial state­
ments.
In summary of our views on the need for precautions, 
we feel that if publication of forecasts is permitted or made 
mandatory every reasonable precaution ought to be taken to 
avoid their misuse by issuers. The most effective precaution 
would be the requirement of a third party review and report 
to be published with each forecast included in filings with 
the Commission. We believe that CPAs could perform this function 
within specified limits assuming that the necessary guidelines 
and standards would be established.
SUMMARY
In closing we would like to summarize our comments by 
briefly indicating our responses to each of the considerations 
proposed by the Commission.
1. Whether such estimates, forecasts or projections
should be required, merely permitted, or prohibited
in whole or in part in filings with the Commission
or whether any requirements should apply only to
certain classes of issues. We feel that mandatory 
publication is not feasible or desirable at this 
time. A trial period of permissive publication 
would provide the necessary experience to reach 
an informed decision on the desirability of publi­
cation. Necessary guidelines should be established
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before starting such a trial period. Experience 
with the reliability of forecasts might lead to 
different requirements for various classes of 
issuers. No doubts certain classes of issuers 
or industries would have extreme difficulty with 
preparing reliable forecasts.
2. Which types of filings under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
should be allowed, or be required, to contain
such estimates, forecasts or projections, if any,
and whether follow-up reporting should be required.
If and when forecasts are permitted or required or 
their inclusion in annual filings would be desirable. 
Quarterly reporting to update forecasts might also 
be necessary.
3. Whether guidelines or rules should be adopted 
relating to estimates, forecasts or projections
which are disseminated to the public through
the communications media by companies whose securities
are publicly traded. We believe that new rules 
should be adopted to regulate the present practice 
of disclosure of forecasts in communications media 
and to achieve more equitable dissemination of such 
information.
4. Whether standard assumptions underlying such
estimates, forecasts or projections are feasible.
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and if so, what types of assumptions are
necessary. We believe that certain types of 
assumptions would be common to most forecasts 
while others would be unique to a business or 
industry. We feel it would be undesirable to 
specify or require any rigid categories of 
assumptions until more experience was available 
through a trial period of permissive publication.
5. What format for presentation should be required.
Forecasts should be as clearly distinguishable 
as possible from historical financial data.
Other than this stipulation and the obvious need 
for adequate disclosure of underlying assumptions, 
we feel that wide flexibility in format should 
be allowed, at least during a trial period.
6. Whether certification or some other form of inde­
pendent verification or report on such estimates, 
forecasts or projections should be required, and if
so, in what form and whether standards for quali­
fication of persons certifying, verifying or 
reporting on such estimates should be adopted. We
believe that a third party review of forecasts 
prior to publication is necessary. An independent 
certified public accountant could perform such a 
review and report on a forecast, but he could not
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express an opinion on the achievability of the 
forecast or the reasonableness of the underlying 
assumptions.
7. The effect of the civil and criminal liability 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on estimates, 
forecasts or projections filed with the Commission
If publication of forecasts in filings with the 
Commission is ever to be a reality, substantial 
clarification of the liability of issuers and 
experts for forecasts is essential. We are partic 
ularly concerned that the framework of the Acts 
concerning a cause of action is inappropriate with 
respect to published forecasts.
#  #  #  #  # 
